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Any use of nuclear weapons would cause  
unacceptable, immediate and long-term  
humanitarian and environmental harm and  
the international community would be unable 
to respond in any meaningful way. 
Advocates of nuclear deterrence argue that this is precisely the point: 
the unparalleled and incontestable effects of nuclear violence  
induce sufficient caution into inter-state relations so as to dampen  
incentives for major power war and deter the use of nuclear weapons. 
The certainty of the deterrent effect ascribed to nuclear weapons 
generates stability, predictability, and security for states.1 
In the UK, for example, the defence establishment refers to its  
nuclear weapons as ‘the deterrent’. In doing so it implies that  
deploying a ‘deterrent’ automatically and unproblematically ensures 
that others will be deterred thereby eliminating strategic risk.  
Prime Minster Tony Blair was quite clear in 2006 when he stated that 
‘We believe that an independent British nuclear deterrent is an  
essential part of our insurance against the uncertainties and risks of 
the future’ and that ‘An independent deterrent ensures our vital 
interests will be safeguarded.’2
Unfortunately there are no risk-free nuclear futures. Nuclear weapons 
generate considerable risk of immediate and long-term and  
wide-spread humanitarian and environmental harm, at the individual, 
societal and potentially civilisational level. Risk can be defined as the 
probability of a harmful event occurring combined with the likely 
severity of its consequences. If the probability of a ‘nuclear event’ is 
greater than zero and the foreseeable consequences are considered 
very harmful and potentially catastrophic, then the existence of  
nuclear weapons carries great risk. 
Nuclear deterrence is a risky business: it is fallible, its effects are 
contingent on context, and escalation of a conflict to the actual use  
of nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out. In fact, the successful 
practice of nuclear deterrence between states requires the perceived 
probability of the use of nuclear weapons to be high. This form of 
nuclear risk is compounded by the routine safety problems of running 
a national nuclear weapons enterprise. The data on such safety risks 
is striking. In the UK context alone we outline 16 submarine collisions 
since 1979, 266 submarine fires in the past 25 years, numerous 
safety shortfalls with nuclear-armed submarines and at the Atomic 
Weapons Establishment, 158 fires at the Atomic Weapons Establish-
ment between 2000-2011, and serious unresolved safety concerns 
with the Trident warhead. These two dimensions of nuclear risk – 
deterrence and safety –  are outlined below. 
Considering the very harmful and potentially catastrophic consequenc-
es of a nuclear weapon explosion, the existence of nuclear weapons 
generates an unacceptable risk. The international community  
has worked hard over the past century to regulate and constrain the 
means of violence at the disposal of states, most recently through 
further regulation of the arms trade. Yet nuclear violence remains  
unencumbered despite the very severe risks nuclear weapons pose. 
This risk can be eliminated through rapid progress to a world free  
of nuclear weapons. The early negotiation of an international treaty 
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2prohibiting nuclear weapons, even without the participation of  
nuclear-armed states, would be an important contribution towards 
this goal. 
The contingency of nuclear deterrence
The successful practice of nuclear deterrence is far from certain. 
Nuclear weapons don’t come with a money-back guarantee that they 
will always successfully deter strategic threats to a country. Nuclear 
deterrence is not a rational, objective, or exact science. It is not a 
‘law of history’.3 It is not an effect automatically generated by the 
mere presence of nuclear weapons. Instead, it is a process and its 
effects are contingent upon the context of the threat. Indeed, nuclear 
deterrence is a theory, an intellectual construct that represents 
international society, states, and weapons, in a particular way.  
It is a theory that is contested, and, as discussed in this paper, 
carries a high risk of unacceptable nuclear violence. 
Nevertheless, the Cold War witnessed a ‘scientization of nuclear  
strategy’.4 This was based on the idea that the practice of nuclear 
deterrence automatically stabilises relations between nuclear-armed 
opponents because the extreme levels of violence embodied by 
nuclear weapons will always induce caution into hostile relationships. 
Leaders could use or threaten to use nuclear weapons as rational 
instruments of the state for achievable political ends.5 The awesome 
destructiveness of nuclear weapons could be effectively tamed for 
practical purposes. But this was, and remains, an illusion of control. 
It requires what US political scientist James Lebovic calls ‘heroic 
assumptions about the adversary – its ability to think dispassionately, 
process information, and make the “right” decision under the most 
challenging of conditions’.6  This can lead to misunderstandings, 
miscalculation or determined resistance to deterrent threats.7 
The Cold War nuclear confrontation is often portrayed today as a 
stable, predictable, risk-averse relationship of assured destruction. 
This is a misleading contemporary narrative. The Cold War was  
highly dangerous, plagued by uncertainty, fuelled by worst-case 
assumptions and planning with very serious risks of a deliberate or 
inadvertent cataclysmic nuclear exchange.8 General Lee Butler, 
former head of US Strategic Command with responsibility for all  
US nuclear weapons, stated in 1998 that: ‘While we clung to the 
notion that nuclear war could be reliably deterred, Soviet leaders 
derived from their historical experience the conviction that such a  
war might be thrust upon them and if so, must not be lost. Driven by 
that fear, they took Herculean measures to fight and survive no 
matter the odds or the costs. Deterrence was a dialogue of the blind 
with the deaf’.9 
A successful nuclear deterrent threat requires those on the receiving 
end to believe that an opponent might actually use its nuclear 
weapons if a crisis continues or escalates. In other words, the threat 
must be credible in the eyes of the deteree. But ‘credibility’ requires 
not just the ability to deliver and detonate nuclear weapons, but also 
a belief in the political will to act given perceived interests at stake, 
an ability to successfully communicate the ability to deliver nuclear 
weapons and the will to act to an aggressor, and an understanding 
of how a particular aggressor can most effectively be deterred.10 
Nuclear deterrence is not a foregone conclusion and there is no 
certainty of success if the deteree is determined to pursue its chosen 
course of action, if it doesn’t believe the nuclear deterrent threat to 
be credible, if it thinks it can control the risk of unacceptable 
outcomes resulting from its actions, if it thinks it can ride out a 
nuclear attack, or thinks it can eliminate the nuclear threat through  
a pre-emptive attack.11
A number of important studies have explored nuclear near misses 
where our collective luck nearly ran out, not least the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. There have been incidents where misperception and paranoia 
could have pushed humanity over the nuclear brink, such as the Able 
Archer crisis in 1983. Episodes where the idea that the presence of 
nuclear weapons makes it somehow ‘safe’ to engage in shooting 
wars because nuclear deterrence will prevent escalation has been 
severely tested, such as the India-Pakistan Kargil confrontation  
in 1999.12 The deterrent effect of nuclear weapons is therefore 
contingent. It is not certain and it offers no guarantees. 
Nevertheless, advocates of nuclear deterrence point to the fact that 
nuclear weapons have not been used intentionally or by accident 
since Nagasaki, therefore the risk of deterrence failing or nuclear 
organisations going badly wrong is exaggerated. A recent article by 
economist Carl Lundgren in The Nonproliferation Review dismantles 
this type of nuclear optimism. Lundgren provides a Bayesian 
statistical analysis of the probability of nuclear war arising from three 
broad scenarios: an international crisis leading directly to nuclear 
war; an accident or misperception leading to nuclear use; and a 
escalation of a conventional war to nuclear use. The Bayesian 
methodology enables statisticians to generate valid probabilities 
‘where only limited data are available and assured knowledge is not 
possible, but important conclusions or inferences must still be drawn 
in order to make choices or set policy’.13 Lundgren’s analysis 
calculates that the ‘posterior combined risk of nuclear war during the 
Cold War (the best estimate after evidence of nuclear crises and 
mishaps is observed) was 44.3 per cent’ and that ‘The first sixty-six 
years of the nuclear age produced a 61 per cent chance of a nuclear 
war’.14 He states that this is equivalent to a 2.1 per cent chance per 
year, or an average frequency of one nuclear war every 47 years.
Lundgren highlights research conducted in the 1980s by political 
scientist Michael Wallace, mathematician Linn Sennot, computer 
scientist Brian Crissey on the probability of nuclear war using data 
from 1978-1983 on US false alarms. They arrive at the conclusion 
that ‘there is an almost 50% chance of a war-threatening false alarm 
of some type occurring during severe length crisis’, defined as a 
30-day crisis comparable to the Cuban Missile Crisis.15 Lundgren 
concludes: ‘Fighting the Cold War with nuclear armaments and 
nuclear threats was a perilous wager. The probability of a failure 
resulting in nuclear war exceeded the probability of making an 
incorrect call while flipping a coin. The world must find a way to 
unwind this desperate gamble.’16
By comparison the UK Health and Safety Executive’s 2008 Safety 
Assessment Principles for Nuclear Facilities states that the target for 
societal risk from a nuclear reactor accident (defined as an accident 
leading to an immediate or eventual 100 or more fatalities, mainly 
from very low doses to very large populations) is 1 x 10 -5 per annum 
at the Basic Safety Level (the minimum target for new nuclear 
facilities or activities) and 1 x 10 -7 per annum to meet the Basic 
Safety Objective (BSOs form benchmarks that reflect modern nuclear 
safety standards and expectations).17 The comparison is illustrative 
as the data for calculating probabilities are so different. Nevertheless, 
it is instructive that the accepted level of a major nuclear reactor 
3accident in the UK is a maximum of 1 in 100,000 p.a. with a Basic 
Safety Level of 1 in 10,000,000 p.a. compared to Lundgren’s 
calculation of a 1 in 50 chance of a nuclear war per year during the 
Cold War. From an engineering perspective such an expected failure 
rate would be criminally negligent.18
The global nuclear order is also evolving. A successful nuclear 
deterrent threat is a process of convincing an adversary not  
to engage in a hostile course of action. This requires some  
understanding of their motivation, world-view, resolve, and 
cost-benefit calculus.19 As nuclear weapons proliferate, the practice of 
nuclear deterrence will become more complex and more difficult. 
Asymmetries in types of nuclear-armed actor (major powers, regional 
powers, ‘rogue’ states, non-state actors), their capabilities, (advanced 
and survivable nuclear forces or a small, basic ‘use it or lose it’ 
nuclear armoury) identities (regional hegemon, defender of a faith, 
ally, ‘civilised’), and intentions (defeat, brinkmanship, coercion, 
regime change, survival) will increase. The ability to ‘know’ a nuclear-
armed opponent in sufficient depth to have confidence in the efficacy 
of a nuclear deterrent threat looks set to become more difficult and 
uncertain.20 
As the nuclear world evolves nuclear risk is likely to increase.  
During the 1990s it was comforting to think that we could continue 
indefinitely in what the late Sir Michael Quinlan, former Permanent 
Under-Secretary of State at the UK Ministry of Defence and guru of 
British nuclear deterrence thinking, labelled in 1993 ‘a world of much 
less nuclear salience’. This was based on a small number of nuclear 
weapon states with nuclear deterrence operating in the background of 
international relations to maintain international order and  
stability by making war between the major industrialised powers 
unthinkable.21 The notion of a stable, benign nuclear-armed world with 
a small number of responsible possessors looked increasingly 
unrealistic as the 1990s progressed and Indian, Pakistani, and North 
Korean weapon programmes escalated and, with 9/11, the risk of 
nuclear terrorism. 
We now look likely to face a long-term choice of either a ‘high-salience 
nuclear world’ 22 with multiple nuclear and near-nuclear weapon states 
in complex deterrent relationships characterised by asymmetries and 
uncertainties; or the further stigmatisation and delegitimation of 
nuclear weapons, leading to their legal prohibition and elimination.23
A low-salience nuclear world could be stable (if not peaceful  
or secure) in theory but its time has passed, if it ever existed.  
A permanently well-managed high-salience nuclear world is an 
extremely optimistic prognosis. An unstable high-salience nuclear 
world would present unacceptable danger. A world free of nuclear 
weapons is the necessary and legitimate path to minimising long-term 
nuclear risk. As Quinlan himself noted many years later,  
‘It cannot be right to acquiesce uncritically, for the rest of human 
history, in a system that maintains peace between potential adversar-
ies partly by the threat of colossal disaster’.24
The inherent and evolving fallibility of nuclear deterrence and the  
consequences of its failure by accident or design constitute an 
unacceptable societal risk. Nuclear deterrence only has to fail once for 
a humanitarian catastrophe to ensue. This nuclear gamble as been 
steadily ‘normalised’ by some as safe, secure and benign;  
it is anything but. 
Safety in a national nuclear weapons complex
Nuclear risk also arises from the operation of a complex socio-tech-
nological system like a national nuclear weapons complex 
that produces, deploys and plans the use of nuclear weapons. 
US political scientist Scott Sagan explored this theme in detail in his 
1993 book on The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents and 
Nuclear Weapons. He looked at a number of serious nuclear 
weapons incidents in the US during the Cold War. He argues that 
‘normal accident theory’ can explain recurrent serious accidents in 
complex high-technology systems like nuclear reactors, commercial 
and military aircraft, space programmes, international shipping and 
large petrochemical plants. Normal accidents refer to a failure in one 
part of a system (material, human, or organisation) coinciding with 
the failure of an entirely different part. This unforeseeable combina-
tion can cause cascading failures of other parts of the system. 
Cascading failures can quickly spiral out of control and be unrecover-
able. Since there are multiple pathways for cascading failures in 
complex systems accidents must be treated as part of life, i.e. 
normal. Redundancy, ‘defence in depth’, a culture of safety, continu-
ous training, and organisational learning can all help to create high 
reliability organisations. But infallibility is not possible because safety 
is one of many competing objectives and layers of redundancy can 
themselves cause accidents. The Challenger space shuttle disaster, 
the sinking of the Russian ballistic missile submarine Kursk, Cher-
nobyl, the Exxon Valdez, Bhopal (the world’s worst industrial 
disaster), the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, are all cases in point. The 
events at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in 2011 
perhaps demonstrate most starkly a cascading unrecoverable failure 
in the nuclear arena. Sagan argues that normal accidents can be 
expected to occur in a nuclear weapons enterprise because they are 
highly complex and tightly coupled systems, meaning small-scale 
failures are more likely to cascade into unrecoverable larger 
problems. He argues through a series of case studies that US nuclear 
command and control systems are complex socio-technological 
systems prone to ‘normal accidents’.25
No nuclear-armed state is immune to this phenomenon, including a 
state like the UK that is generally considered a mature nuclear power 
with a stringent and relatively transparent nuclear safety regime to 
manage a small, secure nuclear arsenal. 
The UK’s Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator (DNSR) assesses that 
those responsible for the UK’s defence nuclear programme have 
maintained an acceptable standard of nuclear and radiological 
safety.26 It also states that ‘Nuclear yield can only be achieved when 
multiple varied inputs are provided to the weapon. These inputs 
would be experienced only in the unique circumstances of planned 
ballistic delivery and, if not precisely sequenced, would prevent the 
weapon from functioning as intended. Inadvertent nuclear yield from 
a nuclear weapon is not considered credible.’ 27 
 
Nevertheless, things can and do go wrong. Risk in a nuclear 
weapons enterprise cannot be eliminated. A survey of regulatory 
audits and incidents in the UK nuclear weapons complex over just 
the past few years demonstrates that accidents do occur and that 
the safety regime can fail or be sub-standard. It shows that this is 
part of the routine operation of a nuclear weapons complex that 
includes nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. The risk of a 
4very serious ‘normal’ accident is very small, but not zero, as the 
following examples illustrate:
Submarine collisions
Since 1979 there have been 16 incidents of collisions and ground-
ings involving Royal Navy nuclear powered submarines for which the 
Royal Navy holds records.28 Perhaps the most worrying of these was 
the collision between UK and French ballistic missile submarines on 
operational patrol in the Atlantic in February 2009 when HMS 
Vanguard collided with FNS Le Triomphant. HMS Vanguard slowly 
returned to port for repairs that lasted until June 2009. Excerpts from 
a review of the collision by the Ministry of Defence’s Strategic System 
Performance Assessment and Analysis Group released under the 
Freedom of Information Act state ‘Nuclear propulsion and weapon 
safety was not compromised during this incident’.29
A US nuclear-powered submarine came within metres of crashing into 
rocks off Plymouth with potentially ‘catastrophic’ consequences, 
according to a Royal Navy report on the incident. It occurred in 
December 2006 when the USS Minneapolis-St. Paul was leaving the 
UK’s Devonport Naval Base. Two sailors were killed.30 Other collisions 
include the grounding of the nuclear-armed HMS Victorious on the 
Skelmorlie Bank in the Clyde Estuary in 2000 and the striking of an 
iceberg by HMS Tireless whilst on Arctic Patrol in 2003. 
Submarine fires
In 2012 it was revealed that UK submarines, many of them nuclear-
powered, had experienced over 266 fires in the preceding 25 years. 
243 were small-scale fires dealt with using on-board resources, but 
67 of these were on ballistic missile submarines. 20 were medium 
scale fires requiring use of significant on-board resources and six of 
these were on ballistic missile submarines. In addition, three fires 
occurred while the submarines involved were in naval bases, 
requiring both ship and external resources. One of these was on a 
ballistic missile submarine.31 
Safety shortfalls with  
nuclear-armed submarines
In November 2012 the primary containment of the reactor compart-
ment for HMS Vengeance (one the UK’s four ballistic missile 
submarines) was breached during refit work at the Devonport 
dockyard. The breach occurred after a series of errors but at a stage 
in the refit programme when the reactor had cooled down from 
operational temperatures with much lower risk of radiation release.32
In 2012 it was disclosed at a Ministry of Defence review of safety at 
the Clyde Naval Base where the UK’s nuclear-armed submarines are 
based that 11 of the bases’ 13 activities have been officially 
declared unsatisfactory. No further information was released.33
A 256-page Nuclear Site Safety Justification report published in 2010 
revealed 22 safety shortfalls for the huge shiplift at the UK’s Faslane 
Naval Base in Scotland where the UK’s nuclear-armed submarines 
are based.34 The shiplift is used to lift 16,000-ton Vanguard ballistic 
missile submarines out of the water for maintenance with nuclear 
warheads and ballistic missiles still aboard. It was reported that 
crane is at risk from earth tremors, high tides, overloading,  
explosions and failed to meet the Ministry of Defence’s own safety 
targets. It stated that although most risks to the ballistic missile (the 
Strategic Weapon System) lay in the ‘extremely unlikely to negligible 
category’ there were a small number of hazards that carried greater 
risk. One of these is collapse of the shiplift. The report stated that 
this could ‘cause inadvertent ignition/detonation of missile/SWS 
ordnance (the nuclear warhead)’.35
Safety shortfalls at the  
Atomic Weapons Establishment
The UK’s Defence Nuclear Safety and Environment Board (part of its 
national Health and Safety Executive) identified a number of risks in 
the Defence Nuclear Programme in its 2011 Annual Report. It 
observed that whilst each risk by itself did not pose and immediate 
safety or environmental concern, ‘Taken together they pose the risk 
that it will become increasingly difficult to maintain that the defence 
nuclear programmes are being maintained with due regard for the 
protection of the workforce, the public and the environment’.36 The 
DNSEB’s latest report for 2012-13 reiterated the challenge of 
sustaining a sufficient number of suitably qualified and experienced 
nuclear military and civilian personnel and warned again that this 
poses ‘a significant threat to the safe delivery of the DNP (Defence 
Nuclear Programme)’.37 
A 2009 report by Ministry of Defence’s Defence Nuclear Safety 
Regulator on ‘Safety Regulators’ Advice on the Selection of the 
Propulsion Plant in Support of the Future Deterrent: Review Note’ 
stated that ‘in a number of areas it is clear that the UK programme 
currently falls short of current relevant good practice’.38 The report 
was reviewing nuclear power plant options for the UK’s next genera-
tion of ballistic missile submarines now in development. Its criticisms 
referred to the acceptance of a much lower reliability from the main 
propulsion system to control submarine depth compared to best 
practice. This carries the risk of an uncontrolled dive from which the 
submarine could not recover. It also set out concerns about a Loss of 
[reactor] Coolant Accident (LOCA), which is a breach in the primary 
coolant circuit that releases fission products into the reactor compart-
ment. The report said the UK compared poorly to US benchmarks for 
reactor pressure vessel safety of coolant loss from submarine nuclear 
reactors.39
It was reported in 2012 that the Atomic Weapons Establishment 
(AWE) at Aldermaston had discovered extensive corrosion in the 
structural steelwork of one of the older manufacturing buildings at 
the site. Routine operations were suspended and a site-wide 
structural survey conducted. The building is thought to be the A45 
site that manufactures highly enriched uranium components for 
nuclear warheads and submarine reactor cores.40 The building is a 
‘class 1’ structure – the highest and most important classification for 
a nuclear structure.41
It was reported in 2010 that the Atomic Weapons Establishment 
experienced 4,020 ‘Abnormal Events’ in 2008 and 3,911 in 2009. 
AWE defines an abnormal event as any action or series of actions 
that causes a deviation from the planned course of events. They are 
5classified into seven different categories; five of these are considered 
to be related to safety. Three in each year were assessed as ‘having 
the potential, in the absence of remedial action, to challenge a 
nuclear safety system.’42 
Fires at the Atomic Weapons Establishment
In August 2010 a solvent fire broke out in an explosives production 
building at the Atomic Weapons Establishment’s Aldermaston site.  
A report on the fire states that no nuclear materials were involved in 
the fire and there was no risk of a radiological incident though staff 
and local residents were evacuated. Electrostatic discharge as 
solvents were mixed was judged the most likely cause, though this 
was not part of AWE’s previous assessments of the hazards and 
risks.43 A separate report by the Royal Berkshire Fire and Rescue 
Service (RBFRS) revealed that the emergency response to the fire 
was hampered by poor communications, limited resources, and 
delays in allowing fire-fighters onto the site.44  It was later reported 
that there had been 50 fires at AWE in the preceding two years.  
AWE said these were all minor.45
 
It was later revealed in a Freedom of Information Act request that 
Berkshire fire crews were called to AWE Aldermaston at an average 
rate of four times per week between 2000 and 2011. Peter Burt of 
the Nuclear Information Service reported ‘Over the 11 year period the 
fire service was called to the site to deal with an explosion, gas leaks, 
an unexploded shell, staff being overcome by fumes and fire 
breaking out in a radiation building. There were a total of 2,252 
call-outs between 1 April 2000 and 5 August 2011. Of this total, 
1,851 were triggered by automatic alarms, the majority of which did 
not require fire-fighters to attend.  However, 158 real fires broke out 
on site over the period’.46 The Health and Safety Executive subse-
quently prosecuted AWE for safety violations whereupon it was fined 
£200,000 for breaching the 1974 Health and Safety at Work Act.
In 2007 the UK’s Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) expressed 
serious concerns about safety at AWE Burghfield (AWE Aldermaston’s 
sister site) where UK nuclear warheads are assembled and disas-
sembled. Over 1,000 safety defects were uncovered and annotated 
in 13 internal reports since 2002, including at least 10 ‘Category 1’ 
safety shortfalls – the most serious of all.47 This created an unaccept-
able risk of a criticality event causing a nuclear chain reaction. The 
plant was allowed to continue to operate because the Ministry of 
Defence insisted its work was vital.48 Nevertheless, the NII restricted 
live warhead work within the plant to a low level and halted it entirely 
between July 2007 and April 2008. In 2006 the NII reported ‘To date 
AWE has provided little information and implemented only a small 
amount of remedial work’ it had previously identified as necessary. 
Still, ‘The NII fault studies assessor considered the amount of work 
yet to be done as significant and following a meeting with AWE the 
licensee provided an updated justification document that again 
failed to detail the programme to completion of the work’.49  
It concluded that ‘It is recognised that the current facilities fail to 
meet modern standards and only the design, construction and 
operation of new facilities will ensure that modern safety standards 
are met.’50 The Ministry of Defence continued to override the NII and 
put continuous operation of warhead assembly/disassembly process 
going to meet the government’s warhead commitments ahead of 
safety.51 The NII eventually judged the facility safe for normal 
operations in April 2009 until its next Periodic Review of Safety  
in 2016.
Unresolved safety concerns with the Trident 
warhead
The British Trident warhead is an anglicised version of the US W76 
warhead. The nuclear warheads are packed around the third-stage 
rocket motor of the Trident missile. The missile was designed like this 
to reduce size and mass. This was at a time when modernisation and 
improvement programmes prioritised military requirements over 
safety, such as achieving maximum yield to weight ratios for 
warheads and maximum payloads and ranges for missiles. In 1990 
concerns were raised about US nuclear warhead safety and a 
number of reports were commissioned by the US House of Represen-
tatives. These reports highlighted the risk of accidental detonation of 
the third stage motor causing accidental detonation of the high 
explosive of one or more of the nuclear warheads packed around it 
potentially leading to widespread dispersal of plutonium, or even a 
small nuclear detonation.52 The risk is compounded by the fact that 
the Trident missile uses the most energetic, or volatile, of rocket fuels 
and the W76 nuclear warhead was not designed to use ‘insensitive 
high explosives’ (IHE) to trigger the nuclear explosion. IHE is less 
prone to accidental detonation, but it has a lower explosive yield 
than non-IHE. Therefore you need more of it to achieve a required 
explosive pressure, so you need a bigger warhead, a bigger  
missile to deliver those warheads the required distance, and so on.  
The problem has not been resolved and represents a continuing risk 
both in the US and in the UK.53 
Conclusion
This list illustrates the routine nature of accidents and safety 
shortfalls within a comparatively transparent and regulated nuclear 
weapons industrial complex. This is an ongoing and an arguably 
‘normal’ feature of operating a highly complex socio-technological 
system required to perform a host of functions to ensure permanent 
readiness to move rapidly from peacetime operations to nuclear use. 
The risk is also evolving. In March 2013 the Pentagon’s Defense 
Science Board reported that the resilience of most US nuclear 
weapon systems against a sophisticated cyber attack designed to 
create and exploit vulnerabilities in strongly protected systems is 
untested.54 General Robert Kehler, head of Strategic Command, told 
US senators that he did not know whether other countries’ nuclear 
command and control systems were impervious to a cyber attack 
that could launch a nuclear-armed missile.55
Finally, it is likely that other incidents have occurred that have yet to 
enter the public domain and perhaps never will. It took several years 
for details of some of the examples outlined above to see the light of 
day. It took 37 years for the crash at RAF Lakenheath in Suffolk to 
make it into the public domain when a US B47 bomber crashed into 
a bunker containing three nuclear weapons whilst on a routine 
training mission. There have been many more accidents and serious 
safety lapses in the UK and other nuclear-armed states.56
6As General Butler, cited above, put it in 1999: ‘Missiles that blew up 
in their silos and ejected their nuclear warheads outside of the 
confines of the silo. B52 aircraft that collided with tankers and 
scattered nuclear weapons across the coast and into the offshore 
seas of Spain. A B52 bomber with nuclear weapons aboard that 
crashed in North Carolina, and on investigation it was discovered 
that in one of those weapons, 6 of the 7 safety devices that prevent 
a nuclear explosion had failed as a result of the crash. There are 
dozens of such incidents. Nuclear missile-laden submarines that 
experienced catastrophic accidents and now lie at the bottom of the 
ocean…I came to appreciate in a way that I had never thought, even 
when I commanded individual units like B52 bombers, the enormity 
of the day-to-day risks that comes from multiple manipulations, 
maintenance and operational movement of those weapons.’ 57
Operating a nuclear weapons complex and deploying nuclear 
weapons carries great risk. Even if the probability of something going 
wrong with the technology, organisational procedures, or the  
practice of nuclear deterrence in a crisis is considered small, the 
consequences from the deliberate or accidental detonation of even  
a single nuclear weapon would likely be catastrophic. It is legitimate, 
in fact it is necessary, to ask whether the deeply contestable benefits 
of nuclear weapons are worth the risk. Most countries have already 
asserted that they are not. Most countries concur with this analysis 
that nuclear weapons are most appropriately viewed as a source of 
risk, rather than some form of insurance against future security risks. 
Most countries strongly advocate concrete steps towards nuclear 
disarmament. Such efforts have been consistently hampered by 
nuclear-armed states operating in a security construct that is 
seemingly dependent on their indefinite retention of nuclear 
weapons.58 Only through rapid progress toward a world free of 
nuclear weapons can we collectively ensure the legitimate protection 
of states and societies against the risk of unprecedented nuclear 
violence. The path to a world free of nuclear weapons will involve a 
number of initiatives, including actions by the nuclear-armed states 
to dismantle and destroy their arsenals, and the adoption of a legal 
ban. It is a striking anomaly that nuclear weapons remain the only 
weapon of mass destruction not yet subject to a comprehensive 
prohibition. Even without the endorsement of the nuclear-armed 
states, such a treaty would be an appropriate response to the 
unacceptable risk posed by nuclear weapons.
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